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1 Introduction
The Formula One (F1) motor racing series has become big business. It started with
the 1950 season, in which 7 races were followed by spectators at the circuits only.
Today, a F1 season consists of 17 races and its television audience runs to billions.
According to FIA (1999), for instance, the races of the 1999 season (including training
and qualifying) attracted over 57 billion television viewers in 206 dierent countries.
Most league sports like soccer or football have a smaller audience since they are usually
subject to national interest only. The Soccer World Championship and the Olympic
Games reach similar television rates. But they take place every four years only. The
F1 series is therefore one of the world's most followed sport events. By selling broad-
casting rights and attracting sponsors, the organizer of the F1 series, the Federation
Internationale de l'Automobile (FIA), transforms this fan interest into a huge revenue.
It is estimated that the FIA's average annual TV revenue (without other revenue from
e.g. merchandising and sponsoring) amounts to 510 million US$.
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A remarkable feature of the F1 series is the tendency to frequent rule changes. In
the past 13 years there were on average 8 changes per season.
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It is apparent that
these rule changes often impede the performance of the racing teams. Examples are
all regulations which restrict the technical capability of the cars, e.g. the denition of a
maximum bodywork height/width in 1969 and a minimum cockpit dimensions in 1972,
the ban of electronic control in 1994 and the reduction of engine capacity in 1995. The
FIA as the rule setting organization often justies this kind of regulation by the safety
of drivers and, indeed, the F1 races have become considerably safer. Today, only one
in every 300 accidents is serious or fatal, compared with one in every ten accidents in
the 1950s and 1960s. But there were other rule changes which can hardly be justied
by safety arguments. In the 2003 season, for example, the number of qualifying rounds
per driver was reduced to one and the teams were no longer allowed to change settings
of the cars between the qualifying session and the race. Hence, the teams could not
improve the setup of the car by e.g. changing tyres or quantity of fuel. Such rule
1
Day, J., 'Formula One Teams to Fight Pay-TV Plans', Media Guardian, February 22, 2002.
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Detailed information on rule changes and the information on accidents which we provide below
can be found on the website http://www.f1technical.net.
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changes usually reduce the performance of the teams, but have less to do with the
safety of drivers.
The major aim of this paper is to provide an economic explanation of such rule
changes. We develop a two-stage model of a F1 season. At the rst stage, the FIA
decides whether to change the rules or not. In doing so, it maximizes its broadcasting
revenue which is positively correlated with the fan interest. The fan interest, in turn, is
increasing in the performance of the racing teams and in competitive balance between
the teams. The FIA's decision inuences the outcome at the second stage where racing
teams with dierent abilities compete for a trophy money which the FIA nances out of
its broadcasting revenue. The team competition is modelled as a contest rst considered
in the rent-seeking literature by Tullock (1980). A rule change is represented either by a
uniform reduction in the teams' abilities or by a reduction in the discriminatory power
of the contest. A decrease in the discriminatory power means that the outcome of the
team contest is determined to a larger part by chance. It turns out that rule changes
reduce the teams' performances, but also improve competitive balance. Consequently,
the FIA decides to implement the rule change, if its revenue gain from the latter eect
outweighs its revenue loss from the former eect.
Using a dataset on the F1 seasons 1950-2003, we empirically test this theoretical
model by estimating its two main implications. First, the theoretical model predicts
that rule changes at the beginning of a season are the more likely and the more com-
prehensive, the smaller competitive balance has been in the previous season. We test
this implication by using a Poisson model and show that a unit increase in the stan-
dard deviation of points scored by the teams in a F1 season signicantly raises the
expected number of rule changes in the next season by about 3%. Second, we use an
OLS regression to test the implication that rule changes at the beginning of a sea-
son improve competitive balance during the season. This will be done for both kinds
of rule changes which the FIA distinguishes, namely the so-called 'safety regulations'
and 'other regulations'. We nd a signicantly positive impact of the rule changes on
competitive balance. A 10% increase in the number of safety regulations reduces the
standard deviation of points scored by the racing teams by 2.8%, while a 10% increase
in the number of other regulations reduces this standard deviation even by 5.6%.
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In recent years, there is a rapidly growing literature on sports economics (for excel-
lent surveys see Fort and Quirk, 1995, and Szymanski, 2003), but we are unaware of
any study focusing on (F1) motor racing. This literature mainly analyses the impact
of specic measures like e.g. revenue sharing on competitive balance in league sports.
Studies inquiring into the optimal regulation of the discriminatory power or the contes-
tants' abilities are not available. Also the growing literature on optimal contest design
(e.g. Dasgupta and Nti, 1998, Amegashi, 1999) does not yet provide such studies. An
exception is Michaels (1988) who considers the optimal choice of the discriminatory
power in a symmetric contest. Since all players are identical, however, his contest is
always balanced and there is no scope for improvements in competitive balance which
is the driving force of our results.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briey describe the organization
and the basic rules of the F1 series. Section 3 develops and analyses the theoretical
model. The predictions of this model are tested in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2 Organization and Basic Rules of the F1
The controlling organization of the F1 motor racing series is the Federation Interna-
tionale de l'Automobile (FIA) with the headquarters in Paris.
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One of the main tasks
of the FIA is to set the rules of the F1 series. It usually decides before a new season
whether and, if so, which rules of the previous season should be changed. Another
important task of the FIA is the marketing of the broadcasting rights of the F1 series.
Until 1996, the FIA itself sold these rights to broadcasting stations. In 1996, the FIA
handed these rights for a period of 14 years to private companies owned by Bernie Ec-
clestone. But Ecclestone is one of the vice presidents of the FIA, and in this position
he is jointly responsible for the rule setting. Hence, also after 1996 the rule setting
institution (the FIA) is in some sense responsible for selling the broadcasting rights.
There are several teams competing in the F1 series. A team is allowed to participate
with two cars. It employs mechanics who set up the cars and the other technical
equipment, and drivers who are still important although the success of a team is by
3
All the following information on the F1 series can be found at the website www.a.com.
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now largely determined by the technical quality of the cars. The main revenue source of
the teams is sponsoring. The leading teams usually experience comprehensive support
from companies of the automobile industry (Ferrari, BMW, Renault, etc.). Payments
received from the FIA represent another important revenue source for the racing teams.
The FIA shares a part of its broadcasting revenue with the racing teams according to
their rankings at the end of the season. This revenue source covers about 20% of the
teams' total costs.
The ranking of the teams is determined as follows. A F1 season consists of 17
events. An event usually lasts for three days. During the rst two days the drivers
have free practice and qualifying sessions. The race itself takes place on the third day.
The drivers' starting positions in the race are determined by their performance in the
qualifying sessions. The driver who registers the fastest qualifying time starts from the
pole position followed by the driver with the second qualifying time and so on. The
drivers get points according to their rankings at the end of the race. For instance, in
the season 2003 the rst eight ranks of a race get points which go down from 10 to
1. At the end of a season, the FIA awards two titles. In the drivers' championship,
drivers accumulate the points scored in the 17 races of the season and the driver with
the most points wins the title. In the constructors' championship, each team adds
together the points scored by its drivers and the title is awarded to the team with the
largest number of points.
3 Theoretical Model
Based on the information given in the previous section, we view a F1 season as a two-
stage process. At the rst stage, the FIA as the organizer of the F1 series decides
whether to change the rules of the previous season or not. At the second stage, the
racing teams take the rules as given and compete in a contest in hope of obtaining
(a part of the) broadcasting revenue collected by the FIA. This two-stage process
is solved recursively in order to obtain a subgame-perfect solution. In doing so, we
assume that the FIA and the teams are prot maximizer. An argument in favor
of prot-maximizing behavior of the racing teams is that they are often under the
control of prot-maximizing companies of the automobile industry. The transfer of the
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broadcasting rights to prot-maximizing companies may be seen as an indication that
prot considerations play a role in the rule setting of the FIA.
3.1 Stage 2: Team Competition
The team competition is modelled as a contest. To make our point, it suÆces to focus
on a contest with two teams. We explicitly model the constructors' championship only
and ignore the drivers' championship. A team is therefore treated as a single player.
Eort of team i = 1; 2 is denoted by e
i
. It reects the salary of the drivers and the
cost of developing and producing the cars (e.g. material cost and the salary of the
mechanics). Team i's eective amount of eort is represented by 
i
e
i
. The parameter

i
may be interpreted as team i's ability of transforming eort into eective units. We
assume 
1
> 
2
, i.e. team 1 is more able than team 2. Such a dierence in abilities may
have several reasons. For example, a team might have better engineers which develop
a more powerful car than the engineers of the other team. Another reason, which we
will refer to below, is the dierent success in previous seasons. It is often the case that
a team is the more experienced and thus the more able in the present season, the more
successful it has been in the past. Such a 'learning-by-winning' eect is in particular
relevant for the F1 series since the ability to realize a good performance of the cars and
the drivers depends to a high degree on trial and error.
The performance of team i is denoted by h
i
. It is an increasing function of team i's
eective eort according to the relation h
i
= (
i
e
i
)
r
with r > 0. Performance h
i
can
best be viewed as an aggregate of several indicators which describe the characteristics
of team i's cars and drivers. Examples for such indicators are the maximum speed, the
horsepower or the air drag coeÆcient of team i's car, the physical and mental strength
of team i's drivers, the minimum time a driver of team i needs for the qualifying round
on a 'representative' circuit or the inverse of the failure rate of team i's cars during
the races of the F1 season. More loosely speaking, h
i
reects the ability of team i to
optimize the interaction between the drivers' and the cars' performance such that they
perform well in a typical race of the F1 series.
The teams expend resources in hope of winning (a part of) the trophy money v >
0. This trophy money is nanced by the FIA out of its revenue from selling the
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broadcasting rights. It is divided among the teams according to their success during
the season. To model such success-orientated payments in a simple way, we assume
that each team obtains a share of v which reects the team's share at total points. For
example, if a team achieves 20% of total points, it also gets 20% of the trophy money
v. Furthermore, we assume that team i's share at total points, p
i
, equals the share of
its performance at total performance of both teams, i.e.
p
i
=
h
i
h
i
+ h
j
=
(
i
e
i
)
r
(
i
e
i
)
r
+ (
j
e
j
)
r
; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (1)
The larger team i's performance relatively to team j's performance, the larger is team
i's share at total points. From an ex ante point of view, p
i
can be interpreted as team
i's winning probability and p
i
v is expected trophy money of team i.
According to equation (1), the parameter r may be interpreted as discriminatory
power of the contest. It measures to what extent the contest outcome is determined
by chance and to what extent by the teams' eort levels. In the extreme case of
r !1, the contest is perfectly discriminating. Eort is then the only determinant of
the contest outcome and the team with the higher eective eort level wins all points.
For instance, if 
i
e
i
> 
j
e
j
, then r!1 implies p
i
= 1 and p
j
= 0. In contrast, eort
does not inuence the contest outcome at all if r! 0. The winning probabilities of the
teams are then p
i
= p
j
= 1=2 and the contest outcome is determined solely by chance.
To put it another way, the smaller the discriminatory power r, the less sensitive is the
contest outcome to variations in eort levels and the larger is the inuence of chance.
Expected prot of team i equals the team's expected trophy money less the cost of
eort.
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If the latter is assumed to be identical to the eort level, then team i's expected
prot may be written as

i
(e
i
; e
j
) = p
i
v   e
i
=
(
i
e
i
)
r
(
i
e
i
)
r
+ (
j
e
j
)
r
v   e
i
; i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j: (2)
Team i chooses eort such that its prot (2) is maximized. In doing so, it takes as
given the eort of team j and the rules set by the FIA at stage 1 of the F1 season.
4
For simplicity, we ignore other important revenue sources of the teams like sponsoring and adver-
tising. It is straightforward to include these sources in our model. But this would merely complicate
the analysis without adding further insights.
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As will be argued in more detail below, the rules of the contest determine (or at least
inuence) the parameters v, r, 
1
and 
2
.
In solving the team contest, we look for a pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium. The
equilibrium is determined by the rst- and second-order conditions of the teams' prot
maximization. These conditions read

i
e
i
(e
i
; e
j
) =
r
i
(
i
e
i
)
r 1
(
j
e
j
)
r
[(
i
e
i
)
r
+ (
j
e
j
)
r
]
2
v   1 = 0; (3)

i
e
i
e
i
(e
i
; e
j
) =
r
2
i
(
i
e
i
)
r 2
(
j
e
j
)
r
[(r   1)(
j
e
j
)
r
  (r + 1)(
i
e
i
)
r
]
[(
i
e
i
)
r
+ (
j
e
j
)
r
]
3
v < 0; (4)
for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j. The rst-order condition (3) immediately implies that in
equilibrium both teams choose the same eort, i.e. e
1
= e
2
=: e

. The closed-form
solution for equilibrium eort can be computed from (3) as
e

=
r
r
1

r
2
v
(
r
1
+ 
r
1
)
2
: (5)
Since team 1 is more able than team 2, it realizes a higher performance and a higher
chance of winning. Inserting e

into (1) gives the equilibrium winning probabilities
p

1
=

r
1

r
1
+ 
r
2
>

r
2

r
1
+ 
r
2
= p

2
: (6)
Using (5) and (6) in (2) yields equilibrium prots

1
=

r
1
[
r
1
+ (1  r)
r
2
]
(
r
1
+ 
r
2
)
2
v >

r
2
[
r
2
+ (1  r)
r
1
]
(
r
1
+ 
r
2
)
2
v = 
2
: (7)
Hence, equilibrium prot of team 1 is larger than that of team 2. For e

to be a
pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium, prots of both teams have to be non-negative at e

.
Equation (7) implies that 
1
> 
2
 0 if and only if
r  1 + 
r
2
=
r
1
< 2: (8)
We suppose the parameters r, 
1
and 
2
satisfy this condition throughout. Note that
the second-order condition (4) is then satised as well, implying both teams attain a
prot maximum at e

. To sum up, if condition (8) is satised, then e

from (5) is the
unique Nash-equilibrium of the team contest.
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3.2 Stage 1: Contest Regulation
Having solved the team contest, we now turn to the rule setting of the FIA at the
rst stage of the F1 season. The larger the fan interest in the F1 races, the larger is
the prot a broadcasting station can realize with the TV coverage of the races and
the larger is the willingness-to-pay of the station for the broadcasting rights of the F1
series. The revenue of the FIA from selling broadcasting rights is therefore positively
correlated with the fan interest in the F1 series. The fan interest, in turn, is increasing
in two variables. First, fans are interested in races with high performances of the
teams. For example, if the maximum speed of the cars is high, the number of viewers
will usually be larger than in case where the cars are quite gammy. Second, fans like
close competition. The more uncertain the outcome of the F1 season, the more exciting
is the season and the larger is the number of people who are willing to follow the races.
To put it the other way round, if it is almost clear from the outset which team will win
the championship, then the F1 season is rather uninteresting for the fans.
To model these properties, we assume that the FIA's revenue from selling the broad-
casting rights is a function R(a

; b

) where
a

= h

1
+ h

2
=
(rv
r
1

r
2
)
r
(
r
1
+ 
r
2
)
2r 1
(9)
is total performance of both teams in the contest equilibrium and where
b

= p

1
  p

2
=

r
1
  
r
2

r
1
+ 
r
2
(10)
is the equilibrium dierence in winning probabilities of the teams. Note that b

> 0
due to 
1
> 
2
. The inverse of b

can be viewed as a measure of the closeness of the
F1 season or, equivalently, of competitive balance between the teams. The smaller b

,
the more equal are the winning probabilities of the teams and the closer or the more
balanced is the championship. The FIA's revenue function R is supposed to satisfy
R
a
(a

; b

) > 0; R
aa
(a

; b

)  0; (11)
R
b
(a

; b

) T 0 , b S 0; R
bb
(a

; b

) < 0 (12)
where subscripts indicate partial derivatives. Due to (11), the FIA's revenue is increas-
ing and non-convex in total performance. Equation (12) states that, for given total
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performance, the FIA's revenue is maximized in the even contest with both teams hav-
ing the same winning probability. Deviations from the even contest reduce the FIA's
revenue at increasing rates. These properties of R reect the above mentioned impact
of total performance and competitive balance on the FIA's revenue.
Prot of the FIA may be written as R(a

; b

) v. It equals the broadcasting revenue
of the FIA less the trophy money divided among the teams. The FIA sets the rules
of the F1 in order to maximize its prot. In doing so, it accounts for the impact the
rules have on equilibrium performance and competitive balance specied in (9) and
(10), respectively. As already mentioned above, the rules of the contest determine the
trophy money v, the discriminatory power r and the teams' abilities 
1
and 
2
. To
x our ideas, we suppose throughout that the trophy money v is exogenously given.
Prot maximization is then equivalent to maximization of revenue R(a

; b

). More-
over, we investigate the regulation of the discriminatory power and the regulation of
abilities separately. It should be noted, however, that our results qualitatively remain
unchanged when the FIA determines v, r, 
1
and 
2
simultaneously.
Regulation of the Teams' Abilities. Let us rst suppose the discriminatory power
r is exogenously given. The rule setting of the FIA may then inuence the teams'
abilities 
1
and 
2
only. A prominent example is the one already mentioned in the
introduction. Since the season 2003, the F1 teams are no longer allowed to change the
setting of the cars after the qualifying. It is therefore not possible to employ experiences
gained during the qualifying session in order to adjust the car to the specic conditions
of the circuit. Obviously, this rule change negatively aects the teams' abilities 
1
and

2
. To model such a rule change, we assume

i
=
1
c
i
+ 
; i = 1; 2; with   0 and c
1
< c
2
: (13)
The parameter c
i
reects the inverse ability of team i in the status quo, i.e. without a
rule change of the FIA. The variable  indicates the rule changes. If the FIA chooses
 = 0, then the rules of the previous season remain unchanged. In contrast,  > 0
stands for the case in which the FIA decides to change the rules. This rule change is
the more comprehensive, the larger is  . The specication of the teams' abilities in
(13) seems to be very special. It has, however, a straightforward interpretation. If we
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dene x
i
:= 
i
e
i
, then e
i
= (c
i
+ )x
i
. Inserting this into team i's prot function (2)
yields 
i
() = p
i
v   (c
i
+ )x
i
. Hence, c
i
may be interpreted as team i's unit cost of
eort and the rule change parameter  works like an increase in unit cost.
The FIA sets  such that its revenue is maximized. The associated maximization
problem reads
max

R(a

; b

) s.t. (9); (10) and (13): (14)
We want to know whether the optimal value of  is zero (no rule change) or strictly
positive (rule change). To solve the maximization problem, the FIA needs to gure out
the impact of the rule change parameter on total performance and competitive balance
in the contest equilibrium at stage 2. From (9), (10) and (13) we obtain
sign

da

d

= sign

r(c
2
  c
1
) 
(c
2
+ )
1+r
+ (c
1
+ )
1+r
(c
2
+ )
1+r
  (c
1
+ )
1+r

=  1; (15)
sign

db

d

= sign

c
1
  c
2

=  1: (16)
The sign in (15) follows from the existence condition (8). It implies that total perfor-
mance is harmed when rules are changed, i.e. when  increases from zero to a strictly
positive value. But this is not the only consequence of a rule change. According to (16),
competitive balance is improved. The reason is that the relative advantage of team 1
(measured by 
1
=
2
= (c
2
+ )=(c
1
+ )) declines. The changes in total performance
and competitive balance have two opposing eects on the FIA's revenue. On the one
hand, the reduction in total performance lowers the revenue since viewers prefer teams
with high performance. On the other hand, the improvement in competitive balance
raises the revenue since viewers like close races. If the second eect overcompensates
the rst eect, then the FIA has an incentive to change the rules of the previous season.
To formally prove this assertion, we consider the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the
prot maximization problem (14). These conditions read
R
a
()
da

d
+R
b
()
db

d
 0; 

R
a
()
da

d
+R
b
()
db

d

= 0;   0: (17)
The term containing R
a
represents the revenue loss of a rule change due to the de-
crease in total performance. (11) and (15) imply that this term is negative. The term
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containing R
b
stands for the revenue gain of a rule change due to the improvement in
competitive balance. It is positive according to b

> 0, (12) and (16). If the latter
eect is negligible, then the solution to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions is 

= 0, i.e. no
rule change. In contrast, if the revenue gain from the increase in competitive balance
is large enough, then 

> 0 and the FIA changes the rules of the previous season.
For our empirical analysis it is desirable to know how the dierence in the teams'
abilities inuences the optimal choice of the FIA. Unfortunately, our model does not
allow a closed-form solution for  since the discriminatory power r is not necessarily
equal to one. But we can gain some insights if we choose a specic functional form of the
revenue function and then simulate the FIA's decision. Consider the linear-quadratic
revenue function R(a; b) = a   Æb
2
. Setting v = 1000, r = 0:4,  = 1 and Æ = 200,
we obtain the simulation result summarized in Table 1. These results indicate that a
Table 1: Simulation Results for the Regulation of Abilities
c
1
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
c
2
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10


0 0 0 3.59 7.83 12.26 16.86 21.61 26.49
rule change is the more likely and the more comprehensive, the larger the dierence in
abilities. The intuition is straightforward. For a small dierence in abilities, the team
contest is relatively balanced even without a rule change. The negative eect of a rule
change on total performance would than be more important than the positive eect
on competitive balance and the FIA does not have an incentive to alter the rules. In
contrast, if team 1's predominance is large enough, competitive balance without a rule
change is quite worse. The FIA can then gain more revenue if she tightens the rules
such that the teams' abilities decline and the races become closer. Further simulations
show that this result is very robust against variations in the parameter values. In fact,
we did not succeed in constructing a counterexample.
It should be noted, that a similar result is obtained in Runkel (2003), but the focus
there is on the case r = 1. Our simulations indicate that the result remains true for
other values of r. This is important since we now turn to the case where the FIA may
regulate the discriminatory power such that r need not necessarily be equal to unity.
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Regulation of the Discriminatory Power. Suppose now the abilities of the teams
are xed and the FIA only has the option of regulating the discriminatory power r.
The FIA frequently used this kind of regulation in the past. The most obvious example
has already been mentioned in the introduction. Since the season 2003, the qualifying
on the day before the race consists of one round per driver only. The outcome of the
qualifying and, thus, the outcome of the race itself is therefore much more inuenced
by chance. For example, if a driver makes a mistake in his only qualifying round or
if the weather conditions in this round are fairly bad, it is no longer possible to try
better in another round. This kind of regulation can be modelled by assuming
r =    with   0: (18)
 reects the discriminatory power in the status quo without a rule change. The rule
change variable is now represented by . If the FIA chooses  = 0, then the rules
remain unchanged. In contrast, the case  > 0 indicates a rule change which reduces
the discriminatory power, i.e. which makes the contest outcome more dependent on
chance and less dependent on the teams' eort levels.
The FIA's prot maximization now reads
max

R(a

; b

) s.t. (9); (10) and (18): (19)
To solve this problem, the FIA needs to know the impact of the rule change parameter
 on the equilibrium of the team contest. The impact of  on equilibrium performance
is not unique. From (9) and (18) it can be shown that da

=d is negative, if the
dierence in abilities is suÆciently large. But it may be positive, if the dierence in
abilities is relatively small. With respect to competitive balance we obtain from (10)
and (18)
sign

db

d

= sign

ln
2
  ln
1

< 0: (20)
Hence, competitive balance is improved when the discriminatory power declines through
a decrease in . The reason is straightforward. A reduction in the discriminatory power
means that the outcome of the team contest is less sensitive to variations in the teams'
eort levels. The advantage of team 1 due to its higher ability then becomes less
important and competitive balance increases.
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This positive eect of reducing the discriminatory power allows the same argument
as in case of ability regulation. Tightening the rules may exert a negative eect on
the FIA's revenue, if total performance declines. But there is also a positive eect on
the FIA's revenue since the championship becomes closer. If the latter eect overcom-
pensates the former, then the FIA has an incentive to change the rules of the previous
season. Formally, this can be seen from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of problem (20).
These conditions are the same as the conditions in (17), except for replacing  by .
To gure out the impact of the dierence in abilities on the FIA's choice, we are again
restricted to numerical simulation. Consider the linear-quadratic specication of the
revenue function and suppose v = 20 and  =  = Æ = 1. The simulation results are
summarized in Table 2. We obtain similar results as in case where the FIA regulates
Table 2: Simulation Results for the Regulation of Discriminatory Power

1
10 30 50 70 90 110 130 150 170

2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1


0 0 0 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.12
the teams' abilities. The more asymmetric the teams are, the more likely is it that the
FIA changes the rules of the previous season and the more comprehensive are the rule
changes. The intuition is also exactly the same as in case of ability regulation. In a
rather symmetric contest, competition is already close and the FIA can gain only less
with a reduction in discriminatory power of the contest. In contrast, if there are quite
asymmetric teams, then the increase in the FIA's revenue due to the improvement of
competitive balance is large enough to outweigh the (possible) revenue decrease due to
a decline in the performance of the teams.
4 Empirical Analysis
In order to empirically test the theoretical model, we oer the following interpretation
of the results. Table 1 and 2 show that rule changes are the more likely and the more
comprehensive, the larger is the dierence in abilities of the racing teams. Moreover,
we argued that the dierence in abilities is inuenced, among other things, by the
13
dierent success of the teams in the previous season. Hence, if competitive balance in
the previous season was low (i.e. the dierence in success was large), then the dierence
in abilities in the present season would be large and the FIA is strongly inclined to
change rules before the season. In sum, we obtain
Hypothesis 1. The smaller competitive balance in season t   1, the more likely and
the more comprehensive are rule changes at the beginning of season t.
A second prediction of the model concerns the impact of rule changes on the equilibrium
of the team contest. Equation (16) and (20) show that competitive balance is improved
by rule changes and that this improvement is the larger, the more comprehensive the
rule changes are. Hence, we obtain
Hypothesis 2. The more comprehensive rule changes are at the beginning of season
t, the better is competitive balance between the teams during season t.
After a rule change the teams will try to improve their performance within the new
set of rules. Since a more able team will do this with more success than a less able
team, after a while (say, one or two seasons later) competitive balance is worsened
again. If the decrease in competitive balance is too large, we return to Hypothesis 1
and the FIA receives an incentive to change rules again. By Hypothesis 2 this would
again improve competitive balance and so on. In sum, we obtain a kind of cat-and-
mouse game between the teams and the FIA. This game might explain the frequent
rule changes we observe in the F1 series.
To test these hypotheses, we use data on F1 seasons from 1950-2003. The data com-
prise information on safety and technical regulations at the beginning of each season,
on points scored by the teams during each season and on the number of fatal accidents
during each season.
5
5
The data on points have been collected from the F1 website at http://www.formulaone.free-
online.co.uk/index.html. The remaining data can be found on the F1Technical website at
http://www.f1technical.net. We do not estimate the impact of rules changes on the FIA's broad-
casting revenue or the fan interest measured e.g. by the number of viewers. The reason is that the
FIA does not publish such data. Some broadcasting stations published data on the number of viewers.
But these data are available for a few years and countries only.
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4.1 Testing Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 identies competitive balance in season t   1 as a motivation for rule
changes at the beginning of season t. The safety of drivers is another motivation for
rule changes. We did not take into account this motivation in our theoretical model,
but in the empirical analysis we have to control for it since the FIA often justies rule
changes by safety consideration. Hence, the explanatory variables in testing Hypothesis
1 are competitive balance and the safety of drivers in season t 1. Competitive balance
in season t   1 is measured by the standard deviation of points scored by the teams
in season t   1. This is the same indicator of competitive balance as we used in the
theoretical model.
6
The drivers' safety in season t   1 is measured by the number of
serious or fatal accidents in season t  1.
The dependent variable in testing Hypothesis 1 is the magnitude of rules changes at
the beginning of season t. Rule changes comprise both the introduction of new rules
and the modication or abolition of existing rules. Of course, the rule changes dier
with respect to their impact on the outcome of the races. For example, the restriction
of the engine capacity usually has another impact as the denition of a maximum
bodywork height. But it is impossible to exactly determine the impact of every single
rule change. We therefore choose a pragmatic procedure and measure the magnitude of
rules changes in season t simply by the number of rules which are modied, introduced
or abolished at the beginning of season t. The underlying assumption is that the
average impact of the rule changes is the same in every season.
The number of rule changes is a discrete variable. Such count data are usually
treated within the framework of the Poisson regression model (e.g. Amemiya, 1986,
Greene, 1993). Following this approach, we denote the number of rule changes at the
beginning of season t by RC
t
and the probability that RC
t
is equal to n
t
2 f0; 1; 2; : : :g
6
In the two-player contest, the standard deviation of p

i
equals b

=2. The standard deviation of
winning percentage is a widely used measure of competitive balance in sports contests (see Fort and
Quirk, 1995, and Szymanski, 2003). Other measures include the standard deviation of winning per-
centage relative to an idealized standard deviation (Scully, 1989, Quirk and Fort, 1992, and Vrooman,
1995), the Gini coeÆcient (Quirk and Fort, 1992), relative entropy (Horowitz, 1997), the Hirschman-
Herndahl index (Depken, 2002) and the ratio of the sum of standard deviations of team performance
through time to the sum of within season standard deviations of win percentage (Humphreys, 2002).
15
by
Prob(RC
t
= n
t
) =
e
 
t

n
t
t
n
t
!
(21)
where ln
t
= x
0
t 1
. The vector  = (
0
; 
1
; 
2
; 
3
) contains the coeÆcients to be
estimated. The explanatory variables are listed in x
t 1
= (1;AC
t 1
;D
t 1
AC
t 1
; SD
t 1
)
where SD
t 1
and AC
t 1
denote the standard deviation of points scored by the teams in
season t  1 and the number of serious or fatal accidents in season t  1, respectively.
The number of accidents enters our regression directly and by the composed variable
D
t 1
AC
t 1
where D
t 1
is a dummy variable equal to 0 for t  1970 and 1 for t > 1970.
For the seasons up to 1969, the impact of the number of accidents on the rule setting of
the FIA is therefore represented by 
1
while for the seasons after 1969 it is represented
by 
1
+ 
2
. The motivation for this specication is that in the F1 seasons up to 1969
many drivers were killed in the races, but the FIA did not react with safety regulations.
Only thereafter the FIA became aware of the danger for the drivers and introduced
more safety regulations.
For the interpretation of the coeÆcients , note that E(RC
t
) = VAR(RC
t
) = 
t
=
e
x
0
t 1
. It follows  = [@E(RC
t
)=@x
t 1
]=E(RC
t
). Hence,  shows the percentage
change in the expected number of rule changes at the beginning of season t caused
by a unit increase in the explanatory variables. Estimating the coeÆcient yields the
results depicted in Table 3. All coeÆcients are signicant and the signs are as expected.
Table 3: Poisson Model for Testing Hypothesis 1
Dependent variable: RC
t
coe. std.err. t-statistic p-value 95% conf. interval
constant (
0
) 0:444 0.092 4.800 0.000 [ 0:262 ; 0:625 ]
AC
t 1
(
1
)  0:211 0.026  8:21 0.000 [ 0:261; 0:161 ]
D
t 1
AC
t 1
(
2
) 0:431 0.026 16:360 0.000 [ 0:379 ; 0:483 ]
SD
t 1
(
3
) 0:028 0.002 15.270 0.000 [ 0:025 ; 0:032 ]
Notes: (i) observations: 53, (ii) log likelihood = -1592.094, (iii) pseudo R
2
=0.159.
Before 1970, the lagged number of accidents had a negative impact on the expected
number of rule changes, since the FIA did not care about the safety of drivers. The
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impact of the number of accidents on the FIA's rule setting after 1970 is represented
by 
1
+ 
2
=  0:211 + 0:431 = 0:22. Hence, an additional fatal accident increases the
expected number of rule changes by 22%. This conrms that safety considerations play
a role in the rule setting of the FIA. However, the coeÆcient of the lagged standard
deviation of points is also positive. This implies that the expected number of rule
changes at the beginning of a season is the larger, the smaller competitive balance has
been in the previous season. More specic, a unit increase in the standard deviation
of points increases the expected number of rule changes by 2.8%. This result provides
empirical evidence for Hypothesis 1 derived from our theoretical model.
7
The results in Table 3 identify the drivers' safety and competitive balance as moti-
vation for rule changes in the F1 series. To gure out which of these two motivations
was more important in the past, we have to compare the number of accidents and
the variation in competitive balance. During the seasons 1970-1989, 24 drivers lost
their lives in fatal accidents, whereas the standard deviation in the dispersion of points
amounted to 8.223. Hence, during this time period the drivers' safety was the main
motivation for the frequent rule changes in the F1 series. In contrast, in the seasons
1990-2003 only two drivers were killed, but the standard deviation in the dispersion
of points was still 8.211. Consequently, relatively to the drivers' safety, competitive
balance became much more important as motivation for rule changes.
4.2 Testing Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis states that rule changes at the beginning of a F1 season improve
competitive balance during the season. This hypothesis is tested by an OLS regression
model. The number of rule changes at the beginning of a season is chosen as explanatory
variable. Since the rule changes in our data set are divided into rule changes regarding
the drivers' safety and other rule changes, we use this information and distinguish
between the number of safety regulations in season t, SRC
t
, and the number of other
regulations at the beginning of season t, ORC
t
.
8
The dependent variable is competitive
7
We also test for overdispersion in the Poisson regression model. The hypothesis that E(RC
t
) =
Var(RC
t
) cannot be rejected on the basis of the likelihood ratio test.
8
We did not use this information in testing Hypothesis 1. The task there was to nd out the
motivation behind rule changes and distinguishing between types of regulation would bias the results.
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balance in season t, again measured by the standard deviation of points scored by the
teams, SD
t
. In sum, we obtain the regression equation
ln SD
t
= 
0
+ 
1
ln SRC
t
+ 
2
lnORC
t
+ 
t
: (22)
Since this equation is formulated in log-values, the coeÆcients 
1
and 
2
represent
the elasticity of the standard deviation of points with respect to the number of safety
regulations and the number of other regulations, respectively.
The results of our estimation are displayed in Table 4. These results provide clear
Table 4: OLS Model for Testing Hypothesis 2
Dependent variable: ln SD
t
coe. std.err. t-statistic p-value 95% conf. interval
constant (
0
) 4:731 0:460 10:29 0:000 [ 3:691 ; 5:771 ]
ln SRC
t
(
1
)  0:263 0:150  1:76 0:112 [ 0:602 ; 0:075 ]
lnORC
t
(
2
)  0:524 0:241  2:18 0:058 [ 1:070 ; 0:021 ]
Notes: (i) observations: 131; (ii) R
2
= 0:3537
evidence for Hypothesis 2. An increase in the number of rule changes at the beginning
of a season makes competition between the F1 teams closer and improves competitive
balance during the season. More specic, a 10% increase in the number of other
regulations reduces the dispersion of points by 5.24%. This eect is highly signicant
at the 5% level. A little bit surprisingly, even safety regulations have a positive impact
on competitive balance. A 10% increase in the number of safety regulations reduces
the standard deviation of points by 2.63%. Although this eect is signicant at the
10% level only, it yet supports Hypothesis 2 and, in addition, may be viewed as a
further indication that the motivation behind rule changes is not always the safety of
drivers: Even if a rule change is declared as safety regulation, it helps to render the F1
championship closer and, thus, the true motivation behind the rule change might be
competitive balance between the teams instead of the drivers' safety.
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5 Conclusion
This study provides for the rst time an economic analysis of the F1 motor racing series.
The main question was to theoretically and empirically determine the motivation for the
frequent rule changes in the F1 series. In the rst part, we developed a theoretical model
in which the motivation for rule changes was competitive balance between the teams. In
this model, a rule change at the beginning of a F1 season has two eects. It reduces the
performance of the racing teams and improves competitive balance. The broadcasting
revenue of the organizer, the FIA, is reduced by the former eect and increased by
the latter. Hence, if the revenue gain from the increase in competitive balance is
suÆciently large, the FIA receives an incentive to change the rules. In the second part,
we empirically estimated this theory for the F1 seasons 1950-2003. It turned out that,
beside the drivers' safety, competitive balance is a signicant determinant of the rule
setting behavior of the FIA. The expected number of rule changes at the beginning of
a season is high, when competitive balance in the previous season has been low. It was
also shown that rule changes at the beginning of a season exert a signicant positive
impact on competitive balance during the season, even if the rule changes are declared
as safety regulation.
What is the current situation in the F1 series? During 1999-2002 there was a
dominance of the Ferrari team which won the constructors' championship and also
the drivers' championship (with the exception of 1999). Consistent with our analysis,
the FIA implemented comprehensive rule changes at the beginning of the season 2003
and, even though Ferrari won the titles also in 2003, the championship in this season
was much more balanced. But in the current season (2004) the Ferrari team regains
its dominance. Its driver Michael Schumacher already won 8 out of the rst 9 races.
If this development continues, then we expect comprehensive rule changes in one of
the next seasons and perhaps they will look like those proposed by Bob Kravitz, the
commentator of The Greenville News: 'Next year Michael Schumacher must drive with
a bag of groceries at his knees and a cell phone aÆxed to his ear. Or maybe, just to
make it interesting, he should be forced to drive in the other direction.'
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